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MolinaHealthcare.com Exposed Patient Records

jeudi 25 mai 2017 à 20:08

Earlier this month, KrebsOnSecurity featured a story about a basic security flaw in the Web site of medical diagnostics firm True Health Group that let anyone who was logged in to the site view all other patient records. In that story I mentioned True Health was one of three major healthcare providers with similar website problems, and that the other two providers didn’t even require a login to view all patient records. Today we’ll examine a flaw that was just fixed by Molina Healthcare, a Fortune 500 company that until recently was exposing countless patient medical claims to the entire Internet without requiring any authentication.

molinalogoIn April 2017 I received an anonymous tip from a reader who said he’d figured out that just by changing a single number in the Web address when accessing his recent medical claim at MolinaHealthcare.com he could then view any and all other patient claims.

More alarmingly, the link he was given to access his claim with Molina was accessible to anyone who had the link; no authentication was required to view it. Nor was any authentication required to view any other records that could be accessed by fiddling with the numbers after the bit at the end of Molinahealthcare.com address (e.g., claimID=123456789).

In other words, having access to a single hyperlink to a patient record would allow an attacker to enumerate and download all other claims. The source showed me screenshots of his medical records at Molina, and how when he changed a single number in the URL it happily displayed another patient’s records.

The records did not appear to include Social Security numbers, but they do include patient names, addresses and dates of birth, as well as potentially sensitive information that may point to specific diseases, such as medical procedure codes and any prescribed medications.

I contacted Molina about the issue, and the company released a brief statement saying it had fixed the problem. Molina also said it was trying to figure out how such a mistake was made, and if there was any evidence to suggest the Web site bug had been widely abused.

“The previously identified security issue has been remediated,” the company said. “Because protecting our members’ information is of utmost importance to Molina and out of an abundance of caution, we are taking our ePortal temporarily offline to perform additional testing of our system security. Molina has also engaged Mandiant to assist the company in continuing to strengthen our system security.”

The company declined to say how many records may have been exposed, but it looks like potentially all of them.

Headquartered in Long Beach, Calif., Molina Healthcare was ranked 201 in 2016 in the Fortune 500. It’s unconscionable that such a basic, Security 101 flaw could still exist at a major healthcare provider today. However, the more I write about these lame but otherwise very serious vulnerabilities at healthcare firms the more I hear about how common they are from individual readers.

Since that True Health Group story was published, I’ve heard about and confirmed two very similar flaws at healthcare/insurance companies. Please keep the tips coming, Dear Readers, and I will do my best to encourage these companies to do more than just pay lip service to security.

Should SaaS Companies Publish Customers Lists?

lundi 22 mai 2017 à 22:53

A few weeks back, HR and financial management firm Workday.com sent a security advisory to customers warning that crooks were sending targeted malware phishing attacks at customers. At the same time, Workday is publishing on its site a list of more than 800 companies that use its services, making it relatively simple for attackers to chose their targets. This post examines whether it makes sense for software-as-a-service (SaaS) companies to publish lists of their customers when those customers are actively under siege from phishers impersonating the SaaS provider.

At its most basic, security always consists of trade-offs. Many organizations find a natural tension between marketing and security. The security folks warn that publishing too much information about how the company does business and with whom makes it way too easy for phishers and other scammers to target your customers.

A screenshot of a phishing lure used to target Workday customers.

A screenshot of a phishing lure used to target Workday customers.

The marketing folks, quite naturally, often have a different perspective: The benefits of publishing partner data far outweigh the nebulous risks that someone may abuse this information.

So the question is, at what point does marketing take a backseat to security at SaaS firms when their customers are being phished? Is it even reasonable to think that determined attackers would be deterred if they had to pore through press releases and other public data to find a target list?

When I first approached Workday in researching this column, I did so in regard to an alert they emailed customers earlier this month. In the alert, Workday warned that customers using single-factor authentication to access Workday were being targeted by email phishing campaigns. The company said there was no evidence to suggest the phishing a result of the Workday service or infrastructure, but rather it was the result of phishing emails where individuals at customer organizations shared login credentials with a malicious third party. In short, they’d been phished.

A portion of the phishing alert that Workday sent to its customers.

A portion of the phishing alert that Workday sent to its customers.

Workday advised customers to take advantage of the company’s two-factor authentication systems, and to enable secondary approvals for all important transactions.

All good advice, but I also challenged the company that it maybe wasn’t the best idea to also publish a tidy list of more than 800 customers on its Web site. I also noted that Workday’s site makes it simple to find an HTML template for targeted phishing campaigns. Just take one of the companies listed on its site and enter the name in the Workday Sign-in search page. Selecting Netflix from the list of Workday customers, for example, we can find Netflix’s login page:

Netflix's sign-in page at Workday.com.

Netflix’s sign-in page at Workday.com.

That link opens up a page that allows Netflix customers to login to Workday using Google’s OAuth system for linking third-party apps to Google accounts. It’s a good thing we haven’t recently seen targeted phishing attacks that mimic this precise process to hijack Google accounts.

Oh wait, something very similar just happened earlier this month. In the first week of May, phishers began sending Google Docs phishing campaigns via Gmail disguised as an offer to share a document. Recipients who fell for the ruse ended up authorizing an app from Google’s OAuth authentication interface — i.e., handing crooks direct access to their accounts.

Before I go further, let me just say that it is not my intention to single out Workday in this post: There are plenty of other companies in its exact same position. The question I want to explore is at what point does marketing get trumped by security? For me, the juxtaposition between Workday’s warning and its priming the pump for phishers at the same time seemed off.

Workday wasn’t swayed by my logic, and they referred me to a marketing industry analyst for the finer points of that perspective. Michael Krigsman, a tech industry analyst and host at cxotalk.com, said he often advises smaller companies that may be less sophisticated in their marketing strategies to publish a list of customers on their home pages.

“Even when it comes to larger companies like Workday, they’re selling so many seats that this information is highly public knowledge and very easy to get,” Krigsman said. “If you’re interested in Workday’s customer lists, for example, you can easily find that out because Workday puts out press releases, their customers put out press releases, and this gets picked up in the trade press.”

WHERE I COME FROM

Fair enough, I said, and then I explained my historical perspective on this topic. Ever since I broke a series of stories about breaches at major retailers like Target, Home Depot, Neiman Marcus and Michaels, I’ve been inundated with requests from banks and credit unions to help them figure out which merchants were responsible for credit and debit card fraud that was costing them huge financial losses.

They sought my help in figuring this out because Visa and MasterCard have contractual ways to help banks recover a portion of the funds lost to credit card breaches if the financial institutions can show that specific fraud was traced back to cards all used at the same breached merchant.

As a result, I’ve spent a great deal of my time over the past few years helping these financial institutions find out for themselves which of their cards were breached at which merchants — pointing them to underground forums where — if they so choose — they could buy back a small number of cards and look to see if any of those had a commonality (known in financial industry parlance as a “common point of of purchase” or CPP).

I’ve never sought nor have I received remuneration for any of this assistance. However, one could say that this assistance has paid off in the form of tips about CPPs from various financial industry sources that — in the aggregate — strongly point to breaches at major retailers, hotels and other establishments where credit card transactions are plentiful and traditionally not terribly well protected.

But even financial institution fraud analysts who are adept at doing CPP analysis on cards for sale in the underground markets can be blind to the breach whose only commonality is a third-party provider — such as a credit card processor or a vendor that sells and maintains point-of-sale devices on behalf of other businesses.

Nine times out of ten, when a financial institution can’t figure out the source of a breach related to a batch of fraudulent credit card transactions, the culprit is one of these third-party POS providers. And in the vast majority of cases, a review of the suspect POS provider shows that they list every one of their customers somewhere on their site.

Unsurprisingly, Russian malware gangs that specialize in deploying POS-based malware to record and transmit card data from any card swiped through the cash register very often target POS providers because it is the easiest way into the cash registers at customer stores. Interview the individual store managers who operate compromised tills — as I have on more occasions that I care to count — and what you invariably find is that the malware got on their POS systems because an employee received an email mimicking the POS provider and clicked a booby-trapped link or attachment.

Alas, Workday was unmoved by my analysis of the situation.

“Spotlighting shared success with our customers helps our businesses grow, but security is Workday’s top priority,” the company said in a statement emailed to KrebsOnSecurity. “We are vigilant about identifying issues and consulting customers on best practices — such as deploying multi-factor authentication or conducting security awareness training for their employees– in order to continually help them sharpen security and protect their businesses.”

For his part, CXOTalk’s Krigsman said he was moved by the story about the POS providers.

“So the question becomes is this a strong enough threat that this is a trade off we should make,” Krigsman said. “You make a compelling argument: One the one hand, for marketing and customer convenience purposes companies want to put this all out there, but on other hand maybe it’s creating a bigger threat.”

I should note that regardless of whether a cloud or SaaS service publishes a list of companies they work with, those companies may themselves publish which SaaS providers they frequent. As Mark Stanislav of Rapid7 explained in Feb. 2015, it’s not uncommon for organizations to expose these relationships by including them in anti-spam records that get published to the entire world. See more of Stanislav’s research here.

What do you think, Dear Readers? Where do you come down on the line between marketing and security? Sound off in the comments below.

Private Eye Allegedly Used Leaky Goverment Tool in Bid to Find Tax Data on Trump

lundi 22 mai 2017 à 22:11

In March 2017, KrebsOnSecurity warned that thieves who perpetrate tax refund fraud with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service were leveraging a widely-used online student loan tool to find critical data on consumers that allows them to claim huge refunds with the IRS in someone else’s name. This week, it emerged that a Louisiana-based private investigator is being charged with using the same online tool to glean tax data on then-presidential candidate Donald J. Trump.

A story today at Diverseeducation.com points to court filings in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, in which local private eye Jordan Hamlett is accused by federal prosecutors of abusing an automated tool at the U.S. Department of Education website that is designed to make it easier for families to complete the Education Department’s Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) — a lengthy form that serves as the starting point for students seeking federal financial assistance to pay for college or career school.

Grand jury findings in a sealed case against Louisiana private investigator Jordan Hamlett.

Grand jury findings in a sealed case against Louisiana private investigator Jordan Hamlett.

In November 2016, Hamlett — the owner of Baton Rouge-based Averlock Investigations — was indicted on felony charges of trying to glean then President-Elect Trump’s “adjusted gross income,” or AGI, using the FAFSA online tool. In the United States, the AGI is an individual’s total gross income minus specific deductions. Diverse Education’s Jamaal Abdul-Alim cites sources saying the accused may have been trying to get Trump’s tax records.

In any event, he failed, according to prosecutors. Last month, the IRS announced that the Education Department was disabling the FAFSA lookup tool because it was being abused by tax fraudsters.

According to Diverse Education, hints about the case against Hamlett came out earlier this month in an IRS oversight hearing before the U.S. House committee on oversight and government reform. At that hearing, “Timothy P. Camus, deputy inspector general for investigations at the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, or TIGTA, alluded to the Hamlett case but did not mention Hamlett by name, nor did he indicate that then-presidential candidate Trump was the target,” Abdul-Alim writes. “Instead, Camus only mentioned that TIGTA ‘detected an attempted access to the AGI of a prominent individual.'”

Attempts to reach Hamlett for comment have been unsuccessful so far, and the complaint against him remains sealed. However, KrebsOnSecurity obtained a response on Nov. 10, 2016 from U.S. Attorney J. Walter Green that lays out the basic facts in the case. A copy of that document is here (PDF).

It’s interesting to note that this wasn’t the only time U.S. government authorities detected someone trying to access Trump’s AGI information. According to the government’s response, the alleged unauthorized attempt at Trump’s AGI data being attributed to Hamlett occurred on Sept. 13, 2016.

In TIGTA Deputy Inspector General Camus’ testimony to the House committee (PDF), he said his office detected a second attempt to access the same “prominent individual’s” AGI data via the FAFSA online lookup in November 2016, although the testimony doesn’t say whether that attempt was successful.

Amazingly, it wasn’t until an IRS employee on February 27, 2017 complained that his personal data was stolen via the FAFSA tool that the IRS moved to restrict online access to the service, according to response to committee questioning from IRS Chief Information Officer S. Gina Garza.

The government doesn’t say in its pleadings why the accused was allegedly unsuccessful in obtaining President Trump’s AGI data. It could be that the Social Security number he had for Trump wasn’t correct; or, the account may have been flagged prior to the alleged attempt.

In any event, I want to take this opportunity to remind readers to assume that the static facts about who you are — including your income, date of birth, Social Security number, and a whole host of other information you may consider private — are likely at risk thanks to well-intentioned but nonetheless poorly secured third-party services that leak this data if the impersonator has but a few data points with which to work.

And of course these data points are for sale via a myriad places in the Dark Web for less than the Bitcoin equivalent of a regular coffee at Starbucks. On this front I’m reminded of the case of ssndob[dot]ru, a now-defunct identity theft service that held this data on more than 200 million Americans.

That service was used to look up the name, address, previous address, phone number, Social Security number and date of birth on some of America’s top public figures and celebrities — data that was later published on a doxing site called exposed[dot]su. The victims of exposed[dot]su included then First Lady Michelle Obama; then-director of the FBI Robert Mueller; an former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder.

Exposed[dot]su was built with the help of identity information obtained and/or stolen from ssndob[dot]ru.

Exposed[dot]su was built with the help of identity information obtained and/or stolen from ssndob[dot]ru.

Fraudsters Exploited Lax Security at Equifax’s TALX Payroll Division

jeudi 18 mai 2017 à 22:23

Identity thieves who specialize in tax refund fraud had big help this past tax year from Equifax, one of the nation’s largest consumer data brokers and credit bureaus. The trouble stems from TALX, an Equifax subsidiary that provides online payroll, HR and tax services. Equifax says crooks were able to reset the 4-digit PIN given to customer employees as a password and then steal W-2 tax data after successfully answering personal questions about those employees.

In a boilerplate text sent to several affected customers, Equifax said the unauthorized access to customers’ employee tax records happened between April 17, 2016 and March 29, 2017.

Beyond that, the extent of the fraud perpetrated with the help of hacked TALX accounts is unclear, and Equifax refused requests to say how many consumers or payroll service customers may have been impacted by the authentication weaknesses.

Equifax's TALX -- now called Equifax Workforce Solutions -- aided tax thieves by relying on outdated and insufficient consumer authentication methods.

Equifax’s subsidiary TALX — now called Equifax Workforce Solutions — aided tax thieves by relying on outdated and insufficient consumer authentication methods.

Thanks to data breach notification laws in nearly all U.S. states now, we know that so far at least five organizations have received letters from Equifax about a series of incidents over the past year, including defense contractor giant Northrop Grumman; staffing firm Allegis Group; Saint-Gobain Corp.; Erickson Living; and the University of Louisville.

A snippet from TALX’s letter to the New Hampshire attorney general (PDF) offers some insight into the level of security offered by this wholly-owned subsidiary of Equifax. In it, lawyers for TALX downplay the scope of the breach even as they admit the company wasn’t able to tell exactly how much unauthorized access to tax records may have occurred.

“TALX believes that the unauthorized third-party(ies) gained access to the accounts primarily by successfully answering personal questions about the affected employees in order to reset the employees’ pins (the password to the online account portal),” wrote Nicholas A. Oldham, an attorney representing TALX. “Because the accesses generally appear legitimate (e.g., successful use of login credentials), TALX cannot confirm forensically exactly which accounts were, in fact, accessed without authorization, although TALX believes that only a small percentage of these potentially affected accounts were actually affected.”

ANALYSIS

Generally. Forensically. Exactly. Potentially. Actually. Lots of hand-waiving from the TALX/Equifax suits. But Equifax should have known better than to rely on a simple PIN for a password, says Avivah Litan, a fraud analyst with Gartner Inc.

“That’s so 1990s,” Litan said. “It’s pretty unbelievable that a company like Equifax would only protect such sensitive data with just a PIN.”

Litan said TALX should have required customers to use stronger two-factor authentication options, such as one-time tokens sent to an email address or mobile device (as Equifax now says TALX is doing — at least with those we know were notified about possible employee account abuse).

The big consumer credit bureaus like Equifax, Experian, Innovis and Trans Union are all regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which strives to promote accuracy, fairness and privacy for data used by consumer reporting agencies.  But Litan said there are no federal requirements that credit bureaus use stronger authentication for access to consumer data — such as two-factor authentication.

“There’s about 500 percent more protection for credit card data right now than there is for identity data,” Litan said. “And yet I don’t know of one document from the federal government that spells out how these credit bureaus and other companies have to protect PII (personally identifiable information).”

Then there is the small matter of the questions that ID thieves were able to successfully answer about their victims via TALX’s online portal. Security experts have been warning for years about the waning effectiveness of using so-called “knowledge-based authentication questions” (KBA) — such as details about the consumer’s historic location and financial activity — for online authentication.

The problem with relying on KBA questions to authenticate consumers online is that so much of the information needed to successfully guess the answers to those multiple-choice questions is now indexed or exposed by search engines, social networks and third-party services online — both criminal and commercial.

What’s more, many of the companies that provide and resell these types of KBA challenge/response questions have been hacked in the past by criminals that run their own identity theft services.

“Whenever I’m faced with KBA-type questions I find that database tools like Spokeo, Zillow, etc are my friend because they are more likely to know the answers for me than I am,” said Nicholas Weaver, a senior researcher in networking and security for the International Computer Science Institute (ICSI).

In short: The crooks broadly have access to the data needed to reliably answer KBA questions on most consumers.

Litan said the key is reducing reliance on static data – much of which is PII data that has been compromised by the crooks – and increasing reliance on dynamic data, like reputation, behavior and relationships between non-PII data elements.

Identity thieves prize the W-2 and payroll data held by companies like TALX because they can use it to file fraudulent tax refund requests with the IRS and the states on behalf of victim consumers. According to the Internal Revenue Service, some 787,000 Americans reported being victimized by tax refund fraud last year.

Extra security and screening precautions by the states and the IRS brought last year’s victim numbers down 50 percent from 2015. But even the IRS has struggled with its own tax fraud-related security foibles tied to weak consumer authentication. In 2015, it issued more than $490 million in fraudulent refunds requested on behalf of hundreds of thousands of Americans who were victimized by data stolen directly from the “Get Transcript” feature of the IRS’s own Web site.

It’s worth noting that – as with the TALX incidents — the IRS’s Get Transcript fiasco also failed because it relied primarily on KBA questions asked by Equifax.

Tax-related identity theft occurs when someone uses a Social Security number (SSN) — either a client’s, a spouse’s, or dependent’s — to file a tax return claiming a fraudulent refund. Thieves may also use a stolen Employer Identification Number (EIN) from a business client to create false Forms W-2 to support refund fraud schemes. Increasingly, fraudsters are simply phishing W-2 data in large quantities from human resource professionals at a variety of organizations.

Victims usually first learn of the crime after having their returns rejected because scammers beat them to it. Even those who are not required to file a return can be victims of refund fraud, as can those who are not actually due a refund from the IRS.

“If the federal government is smart, they will consider suing Equifax for false returns filed using W2 information stolen from TALX customers, since this is exactly the sort of mass scale attack that even the most basic SMS-based 2-factor would block,” the ICSI’s Weaver said.

It’s high time for consumers to come face-to-face with the reality that the basic data needed to open new lines of credit on them or file taxes in their name is broadly available for sale in the cybercrime underground. What little consumer data that cannot be found in the bowels of the Dark Web can be coaxed out of countless poorly-secured and automated services like TALX that hold extremely sensitive consumer data and yet safeguard it with antiquated and insufficient authentication measures.

In light of the above, the sobering reality is that we have no business using these static identifiers (SSN, DOB, address, previous address, income, mother’s maiden name) for authentication, and yet this practice remains rampant across vast sectors of the American economy today, including consumer banking, higher education and government services.

Predictably, Equifax is offering identity theft detection services (for two years) to employees of TALX customers. Loyal readers here know where I come down on these credit monitoring services, because nobody should confuse these services with a reliable method to block identity theft. The most consumers can hope for out of a credit monitoring service is that it alerts you when ID thieves hijack your data; these services generally don’t prevent ID theft. Also, they can be useful for helping to clean up after a confirmed ID theft incident.

The consumer’s best weapon against new account fraud and other forms of identity theft is the security freeze, also known as a credit freeze. I explain more about the benefits of the freeze as well as other options in multiple posts on this blog. I should note, however, that a security freeze will do nothing to stop fraudsters from filing phony tax refunds in your name with the IRS. For tips on avoiding tax refund fraud, check out this post.

Breach at DocuSign Led to Targeted Email Malware Campaign

mardi 16 mai 2017 à 05:34

DocuSign, a major provider of electronic signature technology, acknowledged today that a series of recent malware phishing attacks targeting its customers and users was the result of a data breach at one of its computer systems. The company stresses that the data stolen was limited to customer and user email addresses, but the incident is especially dangerous because it allows attackers to target users who may already be expecting to click on links in emails from DocuSign.

On San Francisco-based DocuSign warned on May 9 that it was tracking a malicious email campaign where the subject line reads, “Completed: docusign.com – Wire Transfer Instructions for recipient-name Document Ready for Signature.” The missives contained a link to a downloadable Microsoft Word document that harbored malware.

A typical DocuSign email. Image: DocuSign.

A typical DocuSign email. Image: DocuSign.

The company said at the time that the messages were not associated with DocuSign, and that they were sent from a malicious third-party using DocuSign branding in the headers and body of the email. But in an update late Monday, DocuSign confirmed that this malicious third party was able to send the messages to customers and users because it had broken in and stolen DocuSign’s list of customers and users.

“As part of our ongoing investigation, today we confirmed that a malicious third party had gained temporary access to a separate, non-core system that allows us to communicate service-related announcements to users via email,” DocuSign wrote in an alert posted to its site. “A complete forensic analysis has confirmed that only email addresses were accessed; no names, physical addresses, passwords, social security numbers, credit card data or other information was accessed. No content or any customer documents sent through DocuSign’s eSignature system was accessed; and DocuSign’s core eSignature service, envelopes and customer documents and data remain secure.”

The company is asking people to forward any suspicious emails related to DocuSign to spam@docusign.com, and then to delete the missives. 

“They may appear suspicious because you don’t recognize the sender, weren’t expecting a document to sign, contain misspellings (like “docusgn.com” without an ‘i’ or @docus.com), contain an attachment, or direct you to a link that starts with anything other than https://www.docusign.com or https://www.docusign.net,” reads the advisory.

If you have reason to expect a DocuSign document via email, don’t respond to an email that looks like it’s from DocuSign by clicking a link in the message. When in doubt, access your documents directly by visiting docusign.com, and entering the unique security code included at the bottom of every legitimate DocuSign email. DocuSign says it will never ask recipients to open a PDF, Office document or ZIP file in an email.

DocuSign was already a perennial target for phishers and malware writers, but this incident is likely to intensify attacks against its users and customers. DocuSign says it has more than 100 million users, and it seems all but certain that the criminals who stole the company’s customer email list are going to be putting it to nefarious use for some time to come.

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